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ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNICATION 
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL WAY OF LIFE IN THE 
PHAEDRUS 
                                                                            Claude MANGION 
ABSTRACT  
This paper develops the theme of philosophy as a way of life by reading the 
Phaedrus utilizing the communicative practices – the forms and media -  of the 
philosophy of communication.  It will be shown that the various forms (rhetorical, 
mythical and dialectical) and media (spoken and written) of communication in the 
text are intimately interwoven with a certain conception of philosophy as a way of 
life dedicated to the search for truth. In the Phaedrus, Plato teaches us the ideal form 
of communication for the pursuit of philosophy.    
Keywords: Philosophy of communication; rhetoric; myth; dialectic; speech; 
writing; way of life 
 
PHAIDROS’TA İLETIŞIM VE FELSEFI YAŞAM TARZI 
ARASINDAKI İLIŞKI ÜZERINE 
ÖZET 
Bu makale media iletişim biçimleri ve araçları gibi iletişimsel pratiklerden 
yararlanmak suretiyle ve Phaedrus okuması vasıtasıyla felsefenin konusunu bir 
yaşam tarzı olarak belirlemektedir. Metinde iletişimin çeşitli biçimlerinin (retorik, 
mitsel ve diyalektik) ve medyanın (sözlü ve yazılı), hakikati araştırmaya adanmış bir 
yaşam biçimi olarak felsefenin belli kavramları ile iç içe geçmiş olduğu 
gösterilecektir. Phaedrus'ta Platon bize, felsefenin peşinde olmak için gerekli ideal 
iletişim biçimini öğretmektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İletişim felsefesi; rhetorik; mit; diyalektik; konuşma; yazı; 
yaşam tarzı. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Communicative practices1 and their role in the journey for those who answer 
to the call of philosophy are not explicitly referred to in the Phaedrus. By 
communicative practices I mean the forms and media of communication and 
I hope to show that there is an implicit and essential relationship in the text 
between communicative practices and the philosophical way of life. In order 
                                                 
 Prof. Dr., University of Malta, Department of Philosophy, 
claude.mangion@um.edu.mt 
1 Durham Peters also utilizes the forms of communication as the lens with which to 
read the text; ‘I read the Phaedrus as a normative grid of communicative forms. The 
first half of the Phaedrus concerns eros, communication to the one, the second half 
concerns rhetoric, communication to the many,’ (1999, p.50). 
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to show this, I will examine two closely related issues: (i) the relationship 
between different forms of communication (rhetorical, mythical and 
dialectical) and truth; and (ii) the relationship between the spoken and 
written media of communication. In addition, this study of the Phaedrus will 
also bring out the centrality of the beloved within the communicative 
practices that characterise philosophy as a ‘way of life’. I use the expression 
‘philosophy as a way of life’ in a narrower sense from that of Hadot2 with 
whom this term is associated. By philosophy as a way of life I refer to that 
person who has dedicated his life to the search for absolute truth, as opposed 
to the person who has dedicated his life to the pursuit of self-interest or 
pleasure. In a sense, the Phaedrus can be read as a meta-philosophical text 
that implicitly describes those communicative practices that enable one to 
embark on philosophy as a way of life.  
The text is composed of two main parts: the first part consists of 
three main speeches that focus on the topic of eros; this is followed, in the 
second part, by a discussion on whether rhetoric can contribute to knowledge 
and a further discussion on whether the written word is an adequate medium 
for the transmission of knowledge within an educational setting3. Although 
the relationship between the parts is not entirely straightforward4, some, like 
Rabbas consider ‘the second part [as] a kind of meta-commentary on the 
speeches on love in the first part’ (2010, p. 28). 
The common thread in the three speeches delivered in the Phaedrus 
is that of eros, a word that is usually translated as love. Eros is a broad term 
that describes a passion for or lusting after something that can be satisfied. 
When it is used to describe human relationships, it acquires the narrower 
sense of sexual passion or lust. The question that interests Plato concerns the 
ultimate goal of eros, a goal that can be articulated in terms of a movement 
from a lower to a higher model of love. These models are not opposed to 
each other where the former is inferior to the latter, but rather, the former is a 
necessary supplement for the latter. From the lower to the higher, there is a 
                                                 
2 In ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’ Hadot argues aht the practice of philosophy in eh 
ancient world entailed the improvement of one’s character through dialogical 
engagement others. In this respect, the content was secondary to the primary goal or 
self-improvement characterised by inner peace, avoiding logical errors and ethical 
participation in the community.  While this ancient ideal was lost with the advent of 
the University in the Middle Ages, Hadot argues that traces of this way of thinking 
can be found in philosophers as diverse as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein among 
others.  
3 Griswold, for example, reads the problem as that ‘of the unity of eros and rhetoric.’ 
(1986, p. 5) 
4 The question of the coherence and unity of the text has been a source of much 
discussion. See Peters 1999, p.38 for some idea of this issue. 
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progressive movement in the trajectory towards the ultimate (Platonic) 
metaphysical vision. At a surface level, love is directed towards that which is 
physically beautiful; it is immediate, sensual and fleeting. But in turn this 
triggers (or should trigger) the recollection of the Ideal of Beauty which in 
turn leads to the realisation of the existence of a world beyond the physical, 
an eternal and unchanging metaphysical world.  
Plato associates love with desire and humans desire what they do not 
have. This fits in neatly with the Platonic conception of love where one 
looks to the beloved to find that which is lacking in oneself. The beloved is, 
in effect, the necessary condition for self-knowledge. But not all conceptions 
of the relationship between love and desire are articulated in this way. As we 
shall see in the Phaedrus, Lysias proposed a conception of love and desire 
that ran counter to commonplace views. It is with Lysias that rhetorical 
communication - as a practice that is associated with the persuasion of 
unconventional views - is challenged by Socrates. 
Rhetorical Communication 
The rhetorical forms of communication are addressed in the first two 
speeches of the text, one by Lysias (231a-234c) and the other by Socrates 
(237b-241d). 
The ‘dramatic background’5 to all the speeches is a chance encounter 
between Socrates and Phaedrus. Socrates discovers that Phaedrus is leaving 
the city walls for a rest after having listened to Lysias’ talk. This piques 
Socrates’ interest and he agrees to Phaedrus’ invitation to walk outside the 
city walls. It is unusual for Socrates to leave the city as he maintained that 
nature had nothing to teach him (230d) but he considers listening to Lysias’ 
speech important enough since he is ‘the cleverest speech-writer of today’.6 
As it turns out, the speech is about love.  
Lysias’ speech is rhetorical because it comes across as crudely 
manipulative and self-serving. Speeches such as this had given the Sophists 
– together with their promotion of rhetoric - a bad name.  Socrates’ follow 
up speech is not rhetorical per se, but is included within rhetorical 
communication because he tries to improve on the defects of Lysias’ speech 
and therefore retains the negative thrust of its claims. Socrates realises that 
                                                 
5 This is the expression used by Ferrari who argues for the importance of the 
interplay between the actual physical context and the dialogues: the ‘dramatic 
background’… ‘becomes a prominent topic of discussion and a direct cause of the 
conversational action, rather than as one would expect, at most, an indirect influence 
on its course’ (1987, pp. 3-4) 
6 A reviewer has suggested that perhaps Lysias was a foreigner and therefore his 
rights to citizenship were questionable; in addition, Socrates did not trust foreigners. 
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focusing merely upon improving a speech while ignoring its repercussions 
would constitute a separation between what one says or does and how one 
lives. This is unacceptable for what is at stake is an ethical relation to the 
beloved, a betrayal of the ideals of philosophy and an offense to the goddess 
of Love. It therefore requires a recantation of the claims made in the first two 
speeches and in the third speech – the palinode – he rejects Lysias’ claims 
outright. 
It is interesting here to note that Socrates insists on Phaedrus reading 
Lysias’ text, rather than listening to him presenting the key points. The 
written text brings the presence of (absent) Lysias to the discussion and, 
anticipating the later criticisms of writing, shows in practice the inadequacy 
of writing as a medium for philosophical communication that replaces the 
presence of the speaker, insofar as Lysias cannot defend himself against any 
criticisms or possible misinterpretations.  
The opening lines of the speech reveal that it is written in the voice 
of the first person, ‘You are aware of my situation…’ (231a). The reasons 
for the use of this literary device can be that it enables what Burke would 
call ‘identification’: the reader is persuaded to the speaker’s views because 
he is being addressed directly. The problem with this is that the reader, or the 
beloved, is placed in a vulnerable position, and therefore susceptible to the 
lover’s demands. Furthermore, this literary device suggests a distance 
between the narrator and Lysias himself. It is not clear if the speech was 
intended for a private audience or a public one, but by being written it has 
moved beyond the context of its reception to another one, and by so doing, 
acquiring a life of its own. 
The speech is structured along the opposition between love and 
sanity. A person who is in love is ‘insane’ in the broad sense of acting 
outrageously, embarrassing himself and others. It is here that the association 
of love with madness in a negative sense is articulated by Lysias. The person 
in love ‘knows he is deranged but is incapable of self-control.’ (231a). The 
startling claim made by the speaker in the speech is that it is in the interests 
of the boy to gratify someone who does not love him, rather than someone 
who does. It is a startling claim because although Athenians accepted and 
practiced ‘“unnatural” aberrations’ it was still assumed that the relationship 
was invested emotionally (Taylor 1960, p. 302). 
The speaker provides a list of reasons (231a-234c) that justify this 
claim: (i) a lover is emotionally unstable: he gets jealous, creates scandals 
and embarrasses the boy; (ii) a non-lover is better suited to take care of the 
education of the boy. Given these two points, it is clear, for Lysias, that the 
non-lover offers better prospects for the boy; his reasoning is formulated 
instrumentally with the relationship structured as an exchange between both 
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participants. Fairness or justice is the central motivating element in this 
relationship.  
Although it might be claimed (Waterfield 2002, p. xviii) that the 
speaker – as the non-lover – is conveniently arguing for his own interests, 
while neglecting or minimizing the interests of the boy, the speaker insists 
that what he is proposing is beneficial to both parties, so that if it is a 
question of crude calculation, then the exchange is beneficial for both 
(234b). By framing the argument in terms of mutual benefit a position 
outside morality is being suggested. The speech might better be considered 
as providing a bit of worldly advice with the opposition between the non-
lover and the beloved dissolved if it also proves to be beneficial for the 
latter’s future. Given that within Greek culture, the older man was expected 
to provide for the educational and social advancement of the beloved, would 
it not be better to have a rational non-lover over an irrational lover as one’s 
educator? From a coldly analytical perspective the answer is a resounding 
‘yes’. But the problem is that the speech is supposed to be about love and, 
given the business-like relationship that it is suggesting, one could have just 
as easily called it by another name.  One might easily call the non-lover a 
friend with whom one exchanged sexual pleasures without the emotional 
investment usually associated with love. Lysias is thinking along these lines 
when he states that, when a love affair is over and the emotions have 
subsided, the lover disappears from the beloved’s life while the non-lover – 
as a friend – remains part of the beloved’s life. The manipulative and 
rhetorical aspect of this speech can be understood here for Lysias is using the 
name of ‘love’ to persuade the beloved to accept something that is not love 
at all. 
Phaedrus is delighted with the speech but Socrates raises the 
suspicion that Lysias was dissatisfied by it (235a) because, apart from the 
obvious point that an irrational lover is annoying, it shows no creativity; if 
there is anything of value to the speech it must be found in the arrangement 
of the material. Phaedrus responds by challenging Socrates to provide a 
better one. Since Socrates’ first speech (237b-241d) falls within the mind-set 
of Lysias who wanted to persuade without any concern for truth, Socrates 
adopts the role of a rhetorician to show that even as a piece of rhetorical 
communication, the first speech has many failings. Interestingly, the 
deceitful nature of rhetoric is indirectly alluded to by the speaker of this 
speech who ‘was in love with the boy as much as anyone [but] had 
convinced him that he was not’ (237b). In this scenario, the non-lover is not 
indifferent to the beloved, but only hiding or pretending to be. This 
  
 
 
 
 
MANGION, C.                                     EDEBİYAT FAKÜLTESİ (2019) 
 
27 
 
pretending is important because as Peters highlights, ‘such a thing as a non-
loving lover is not even possible.’7 (1999, p. 41) 
Socrates’ next step is to show that even a rhetorician needs to know 
what he is attempting to understand. And to know something means to be 
able to define it: Lysias failed to define love, which would make the whole 
enterprise of persuasion a non-starter. Perhaps indirectly or unconsciously, 
Socrates is suggesting at this early state that for rhetoricians to succeed there 
must be a philosophical background to their communicative endeavours. 
This is why he states that ‘we should establish a mutually acceptable 
definition of love.’ (273c-d) Love is now defined broadly as ‘a kind of 
desire’ and this desire is then further specified as either a ‘desire for 
pleasure’ or ‘an acquired mode of thought which arises for what is best.’ 
(237e) On Lysias’ account, love is the name of an ‘irrational desire’ that has 
the ‘upper hand’ in its relation towards the other person (238c).  
What follows in Socrates’ speech is a re-organisation of the speech 
so that the ideas are ordered in a way that the effects upon the lover are 
grouped into mind, body and property. The following list of reasons justify 
why the beloved should not choose someone who loves him, but rather 
choose someone who doesn’t love him (239a-241d). The lover wants the 
beloved to be inferior (so the beloved looks up to him), without friends (so 
the beloved would depend on him), without the possibility of studying 
philosophy (for he would learn to think for himself), physically soft (to be 
able to please the lover), without possessions (as these might attract the 
attention of the beloved), a potential embarrassment (in public with his 
obsessive talk about the beloved), who might in turn, abandon the beloved 
(when his passion has subsided) and renegade on all his promises. Socrates 
sums up the mistake of having a lover  
[H]e is bound to be surrendering himself to a man who is 
untrustworthy, bad-tempered, jealous, unpleasant, and harmful 
not just to his property and his physical condition but even more 
so to his mental development, which is in actual fact the most 
valuable thing there is or ever will be in the eyes of both gods 
and men. (241c-d) 
Socrates’ speech is superior to Lysias’ in that it introduces a more 
sophisticated account of desire and human motivation. By distinguishing 
                                                 
7 Another possibility is suggested by Taylor: by pretending to be a non-lover 
‘Socrates [has] a double advantage from even a playful defense of a morally 
disgraced thesis, and he leaves himself free, if he pleases, to urge subsequently that 
the apparent reasonability of the speech is only the simulated rationality of a 
madman, since the client into whose mouth it is put is really inspired all the time by 
“romantic love”’ (1960, p. 303) 
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between those irrational desires that have pleasure as their goal and those 
rational desires that have the good as their goal, a measure of philosophical 
rigour is introduced into the speech. This, at the very least, shifts the 
direction of the argument towards what is morally good (Taylor 1960, p. 
304). But it cannot hide the fact that since Socrates’ speech is merely trying 
to improve upon the stylistic issues that have been raised by Lysias’ speech 
(the importance of definition and the arrangement of material), it still 
remains framed within a calculative way of thinking. Reason is being 
misused in that it is not being put into the service of the good but at what can 
be gained i.e., the beloved. It is not enough to improve something that is 
inherently wrong. Socrates wants to argue that love is more than rational 
calculation because it is something that affects the whole being of a person: 
to be in love is to be passionate about the beloved, and ultimately, it is to 
want to transform their life by attracting them towards the philosophical way 
of life. This is the crucial issue for Socrates: philosophy is not just the 
presentation of logical arguments but a way of life that searches for an 
absolute truth. This is also Ferrari’s view who adds the interesting point that 
in principle Socrates could not engage or provide a fair assessment of 
Lysias’ speech because both Lysias and Socrates represent different ways of 
life: ‘…their exchange is set against two backgrounds which refuse to mesh. 
Moreover, because these are backgrounds to their way of speaking, nothing 
that they say – in particular, no argument they might make – can of itself 
compel a shift from one background to the other’ (1987, p.56). 
 Socrates judges both speeches to be ‘awful’ (242d) and realising 
that saying such things about love is offensive to the goddess of Love, he 
decides to deliver a palinode by way of apologising for his mistake (243b). 
The point this section establishes is that the rhetorical form of 
communication can never replace the philosophical journey towards the 
metaphysical truth o  
Mythical Communication  
There are a number of mythical narratives or allusions to mythical figures in 
the Phaedrus, but there are two myths that form an integral part of the 
dialogue as a whole. In the palinode, the myth of the soul as a chariot driven 
by a white and black horse constitutes the background to understanding the 
conflicts and effort that are required for the soul to attain the vision of truth 
(253d-e), while the myth on the origin of writing is situated within the 
discussion on rhetoric (274d- 278d). The latter will be examined in the 
section on the medium of communication. 
The palinode opens with a philosophical elaboration of different 
kinds of madness by way of countering Lysias’ negative view of love as a 
madness that should be avoided. His analysis exemplifies the 
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methodological practice of philosophy that I will discuss in the next section. 
The crucial point here is that the madness of love opens the way to a 
discussion and understanding of the nature of the soul as well as, 
fundamentally, its place within the universe.  The myth of the soul as a 
chariot connects Plato’s metaphysical vision with the person who embarks 
(or fails to embark) upon the philosophical way of life with the bridge that 
connects the self with the true world mediated through the ‘mad’ love of the 
beloved.  
The first part of the myth (246a-250c) describes the ‘character’ of 
the immortal soul and the myth opens with a justification of why myth is 
needed to help us understand its character in the first place.  By admitting to 
the limitations of ‘human powers’, it is claimed that the best way of 
understanding this character is through an analogy of the soul as an ‘organic 
whole made up of a charioteer and his team of horses’ (246a). Later, 
Socrates describes in detail the characteristics of both horses: one is ‘white 
in colour, and dark-eyed’ with ‘his determination to succeed …tempered by 
self-control and respect for others’ and the other ‘black in colour…an ally of 
excess and affectation…’ (253c-d). 
The metaphysical version of this myth describes a ‘complete’ soul, 
i.e., one that is white and good, and an ‘incomplete one’ i.e., one that has its 
wings damaged, and which, as a result, falls until it acquires a body. The 
metaphor of the wing is appropriate because through flight humans can 
travel to the gods. The gods also travel in winged chariots and they can 
travel to the rim of the heavens and where they are granted the vision of 
reality, the region of ‘true being… the province of everything that counts as 
true knowledge.’ (247d). Life for humans is different because of the 
disharmony between the horses within the chariot. As a result, only some 
manage to catch a glimpse of reality and others much less so. In addition, 
they frequently, fall back to earth, forgetting most of what they have seen, 
but having the possibility of reincarnation. And crucially, to be reincarnated 
with a human form entails the recognition of truth since only humans can 
classify their impressions into classes. Since only human beings recognize 
the truth, then the truth must have been seen before so as to be recognised in 
the first place; if humans never experience truth they would not know it 
when it appeared before them (249b).  
The philosopher has a crucial advantage over others: the experience 
of beauty in this world can lead him to recollect the Form or Ideal of Beauty. 
The benefit of this recollection is that it ‘nourishes’ his wings, enabling them 
to grow faster; in addition, there is also the important proviso that his 
uplifting towards the world of Beauty requires control of the black horse. For 
the philosopher, the vision of truth that he had experienced in a previous life 
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leaves its trace upon him in the present life; as a result, he is never satisfied 
with the incomplete truths of this world.  
By virtue of its physical embodiment the soul is subjected to 
different desires; but as humans learn to control and direct their desires 
towards the good, they are transformed into philosophers and choose 
philosophy as a way of life. If the person follows this path for three 
successive lifetimes, he is free from the cycle of reincarnation and his soul is 
simple and pure. This elaboration helps Plato articulate why it is that human 
failings as the result of those desires that hinder the soul’s pursuit of the 
good. 
The second part of the myth complements the first part by focusing 
on the interpersonal relationship between the lover and the figure of the 
beloved that is central to the philosophical way of life. Beauty is central to 
this relationship and the difference between the effect of beauty on the lover 
and Lysias’ non-lover is that while both are attracted to the beauty of the 
beloved, Lysias’ non-lover is solely attracted to the physical dimension of 
the relationship and the satisfaction of his sexual desire. This is very 
different from the Platonic lover who considers physical beauty as the 
stimulation towards the superior world of Ideal Beauty (254c). The second 
type of lover is the philosopher.  
For Brook (2010), the scenario in which the philosopher is excited 
by the beauty of the beloved represents an objectification of the beloved. 
Since there is no sexual contact between the philosopher and the beloved, the 
body of the beloved ‘becomes an entity for examination’ (266). It is 
something that is spoken about and recuperated within the discourse of 
beauty where the beauty of the boy is merely there to instantiate the 
recollection of absolute Beauty. The boy is ‘used’ as a stimulus for the 
philosopher: ‘the young man truly has nothing to offer in himself, only in the 
way beauty of his body points away from the body to a disembodied 
universal Truth.’ (267) However, I find this characterisation of the 
relationship between the philosopher-lover and the beloved to be somewhat 
one-sided for it does not take into account the obligations of the philosopher-
lover towards for the beloved and neither does it take into consideration the 
perspective of the beloved, who is also looking after his interests in the 
relationship.  
The question is raised as to who the ideal match is for the 
philosopher: what type of boy is he looking for? Socrates invokes the 
hierarchy of the gods in his answer to this question (252c-253a) claiming 
that the choice of the beloved is a projection of the god a philosopher 
identifies with. Just as he directs his behaviour towards ‘honouring and 
imitating’ this god, the choice of beloved is determined the same qualities 
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being possessed by the beloved. In the case of philosophers, the god is Zeus, 
and 
…[they]want someone with a Zeus-like soul as their beloved. 
They look for someone with the potential to be a philosopher 
and a leader, and when they find him and have fallen in love 
with him, they do all they can to develop this potential in him.  
The relationship between the philosopher-lover and the beloved is 
not one-sided.  The philosopher as lover feels a sense of obligation towards 
the beloved for it is he who has brought them closer to their god (253a). He 
feels that the blessed madness of love that he has received should be 
reciprocated and he ‘feel[s] even more affection’ for the beloved. The boy is 
not merely there to satisfy the longings of the philosopher but is an essential 
part of the relationship and this is why the philosopher strives to bring out 
the philosopher in the boy.  
From the perspective of the beloved something else is taking place. 
The beloved ‘experience[s] from close at hand …the lover’s good will’ 
(255b) and realises that all the friendships in the world will not amount to 
the love bestowed upon him by the philosopher inspired as he is, ‘by a god’. 
The beloved is new to the experience of love and does not know what is 
happening to him (255d) but upon recognising the goodness of the older man 
falls in love with him (255a). He is unsure about how to respond 
appropriately to the feelings he has towards him. Internally he is conflicted 
(256a-b) but learns that it is not the sexual dimension that is the source of the 
attraction he feels but something greater. Through the practice of self-control 
and restraint he has been inducted into the lifestyle of this philosopher-lover 
and his initiation into the philosophical way of life has commenced. The 
reciprocal direction of love has led Peters to claim that  
Socrates’ innovation was to forward a vision of symmetry as a 
criterion of genuine love…. [he] treats interpersonal 
communication as not only a happy mode of message exchange 
but, at its finest, the mutual salvation of souls in each other’s 
love beneath the blessings of heaven. (1999, pp. 44-45) 
It is clear, therefore, that the beloved is the other of the philosopher 
and he constitutes an essential feature of the philosophical way of life. The 
philosopher also wants the beloved to participate in the philosophical quest 
for the truth of the real and his goal is to motivate the beloved towards that 
which is truly important. Thus, while it might seem that the quest of the 
philosopher as lover is given priority, the figure of the beloved remains the 
necessary supplement for the initiation into the Platonic way of life towards 
philosophy and truth.  
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It might be asked whether there are other qualities in the beloved 
(kindness, humility) that might be better to develop rather than the qualities 
acquired through philosophy (truth, knowledge). Although Plato would 
argue that in the long term the benefits of having a philosophical education 
will be apparent, there is an obvious bias here. So too, a person is made up of 
a number of qualities, some of which, might not fit in well with the qualities 
required of a philosopher. This raises the problem of the singularity of the 
beloved who might also desire the path of philosophy but not have the 
patience for it, or might be too ambitious as a person. 
There is clearly a sharp distinction between the madness of love that 
attracts the philosopher and the madness of love that Lysias is critical of. 
And in a final rebuke of Lysias, Socrates comments on the privileges of 
having a lover, ‘[a]ll these are the divine gifts you will gain from the 
friendship of a lover, young man. But since the companionship of a non-
lover is tempered by human sanity, it delivers meagre and mortal rewards.’ 
(257a) 
From the perspective of the form of communication that underlies 
this study, how do mythical forms of communication contribute to the 
philosophical way of life that Plato is advocating? The Phaedrus is not the 
only text within the Platonic corpus in which we find mythical narratives and 
Plato uses them when he wants to communicate an idea that cannot be 
argued for rationally.8 As a form of communication, mythical narratives 
enjoin its readers to either accept or reject them, and Socrates alludes to this 
quality of myths when he states, ‘You can believe this or not, as you wish’ 
(252c). This, however, does not imply that they should not be taken 
seriously. These myths tell us stories about the beginnings and ends of the 
universe, life and so on. They help us understand our place in the universe. 
Such myths, frequently called ‘protomyths’9, are universal in their concerns 
despite obvious cultural inflections.  The Platonic myths concerning the soul 
and its place in the universe can be considered as such. Mythical truth is not 
opposed to the truths of the dialectic, but compliments it: the truths of 
mythical narratives can be considered as disclosive, but not compelling in 
their force. This is why communication that utilises the form of the dialectic 
is important for the philosophical way of life. The dialectic is compelling in 
                                                 
8 It could be argued that mythical narratives are utilised by Plato as protreptic 
devices rather than my claim (at least of the Phaedrus) that they are a non-rational 
and non-argumentative form of communication that discloses certain truths. 
Perhaps, if a protreptic device is intended to instruct or persuade, then this is also 
what Plato is attempting: he wants to instruct or persuade his readers that mythical 
communication is ‘good’ but not as ‘good’ as the dialectical form of 
communication. 
9 See Serracino Inglott (1987) for an elaboration of this view. 
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its force because its truths have been subjected to the rigours of logical 
analysis. 
Dialectical communication 
The discussion of the dialectic as the communicative form best suited to the 
philosophical way of life is framed in opposition to other forms of educative 
practices available to the student within Greek culture such as ‘dramatic and 
epic verse, the study of sophistry as well as rhetoric.’ (Waterfield 2002, 
p.xxxiii). Plato’s concern with rhetoric is well known from the Gorgias, and 
in the Phaedrus, he returns to the challenge posed by rhetoric as a viable 
form of education. In relation to the issues raised in the rest of the text, the 
return to the problem of rhetoric might seem out of place. But given the 
scope of rhetoric within Greek culture – it can be spoken or written, in 
private and in public10 - Plato is determined to reveal it for what it is.  
Given rhetoric’s challenge to the dialectic, one might legitimately 
ask: is there such a thing as ‘good’ rhetoric? Must rhetoric always be 
associated with manipulation? And how can one persuade others about the 
truth of something? Perhaps, Socrates thinks, the answer to these questions 
lies in understanding what is entailed by being an expert in any particular 
field. Expertise of a subject means having the knowledge of that subject and 
the acquisition of knowledge can only be obtained by using a method.  
Socrates outlines the method (265a-266c) with which one acquires 
knowledge and truth. He calls it the method of ‘collection and division’: by 
collection he means the grouping under one class of a number of things so 
that they can be defined and, while the definition might be debatable, this 
procedure will have the merit of producing ‘clarity and internal consistency’. 
The process of division entails specifying the differences within the 
classification. Socrates demonstrates the method (244a-245c) through an 
analysis of love that is defined as madness. However, madness itself is a 
generic term that can be further specified. While the first speech described 
the madness of love negatively, as something to be avoided, the palinode 
identifies different kinds of madness: the madness of the seers of the future; 
the ritualised madness of those who purify, initiate and found religions; the 
inspired madness of the poet and finally the divine madness of love.  
Socrates reveals that the method of ‘collection and division’ is 
another name for the ‘dialectic’ and more importantly, it is the only method 
that enables one to acquire knowledge and truth in any subject. In other 
words, it is not restricted to philosophers, but is the appropriate method for 
anyone who claims to be an expert on something. 
                                                 
10 See 257c-258c, 261a, and 261 d-e 
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The question remains as to what the experts of rhetoric consider 
essential to their discipline. Socrates presents a long list of ‘rhetorical 
refinements’ (266d-267d), but while admitting that these are useful in ‘mass 
meetings’, he further adds that something crucial is missing. To be able to 
claim that one is an expert in a subject - and Socrates cites medicine, tragedy 
and music as examples – requires the thorough knowledge of the nature of 
these disciplines not the ‘rhetorical refinements’ which are only 
‘preliminaries’. As he clearly states 
In both [medicine and rhetoric] cases you have to determine the 
nature of something – the body in medicine and the soul in 
rhetoric – if you’re going to be an expert practitioner, rather 
than relying merely on an experiential knack. In the one you 
employ drugs and diet to give the body health and strength, and 
in the other case you employ speeches to give the soul whatever 
convictions you want, and lawful practise to make it virtuous.’ 
(269b) 
The upshot is clear: rhetoricians are concerned with superficialities 
but manage to pass themselves off as knowledgeable. Philosophers, on the 
other hand, are interested in knowing the truth of the object of their 
understanding. And this truth can only be derived by adopting the dialectical 
method of question and answer. 
The Media of Communication: the spoken and the written word 
During the discussion on the value of rhetoric, Socrates raises the question of 
the value of the written word since it was customary for rhetoricians to teach 
their students how to write speeches. Once again, Socrates resorts to a 
mythical account to frame his rejection of the written word with the myth of 
Theuth and Thamus. The myth, coming towards the end of the Phaedrus, has 
been the source of many conflicting views among scholars. Derrida has 
pointed out that its sudden appearance without any connection to the themes 
that dominate the rest of the text have led some to consider it the work of 
Plato’s youthful thinking; for others, ironically, it is the work of his aging 
mind and its place in the text should be considered as an error of judgement 
that we should not take too seriously.  The line of argument this paper has 
been following echoes that of Peters who claims that the critique of writing 
is not ‘out of place’ but ‘a logical outgrowth of the argument that good and 
just relations among people requires a knowledge of care for souls.’ (1999, 
p. 47) 
Socrates begins the narration of the myth with the lines ‘the story I 
heard…’ (274a). He is pointing out to its status as a narrative that has been 
passed on from others, the implication being that the myth is transmitted and 
accepted as part of a tradition. The myth of Theuth-Thamus describes the 
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‘gift’ of writing and its subsequent rejection. Thamus, the king of Egypt is 
given a number of gifts by the god Theuth, gifts that are intended to help 
humanity. Among these gifts we find, ‘arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, 
of games involving draughts and dice---and especially of writing.’ (274d-
275b). 
Of all these gifts, Theuth considered writing to be the most valuable, 
but Thamus rejects it while accepting the rest. Thamus’ response, 
interestingly, is that while Theuth deserved the credit for inventing writing, it 
frequently happens that those who invent something are in no position to 
judge the consequences of their invention. This is the situation with Theuth 
who does not realise the effects that the introduction of this new medium 
will bring about. In an inversion of authoritative hierarchy, it turns out that 
the king is wiser than the god. The problem with writing is that (i) it ruins 
the memory of people, for instead of learning to remember on their own, 
they are relying on texts written by others; mental laziness is the immediate 
result11; (ii) students will read several texts and believe that they have 
acquired knowledge. Because it is read alone, perhaps repeatedly blindly, it 
has the appearance of knowledge12, but this is not true knowledge for this 
requires that it is critically engaged in the communicative dialectic.13 
After Phaedrus concedes that Thamus is correct in his objections to 
writing, Socrates raises four more objections to writing. He claims that (i) 
texts are written in the belief by their authors that their expertise will survive 
them after their death and that (ii) texts are read by ‘anyone who inherits’ 
them on the assumption that what they are reading is ‘clear and reliable’ 
(275c-d). Furthermore, Socrates adds (275d-e) (iii) that like a painting, 
writing is mute: if you ask a written text what a passage means, you will 
only find the same words; a written text cannot explain, but only repeat, (iv) 
once written, a text has a life of its own: it can reach the wrong or 
‘inappropriate’ audience and they can interpret it in whatever way they like. 
                                                 
11 Lentz raises the interesting point that paradoxically, Plato attacks memory in the 
Republic since it is associated with the oral tradition, while in the Phaedrus, it 
constitutes the basis of his epistemological attack on writing (1983, p. 291). 
12 In part, Plato’s critique of writing is a also a critique of the rhetoricians and the 
Sophists who were associated with writing (See, for example, Couthard and Keller 
2012, Rabbas 2010). 
13 Rabbas gives an excellent example of the lack of understanding that writing 
promotes: ‘if I utter the formula ‘E = mc2, I can only do this meaningfully if I know 
what I am talking about, i.e., if I know physics. If I don’t, my utterance will be mere 
words. In that case the statement that E = mc2 won’t be my statement, really – it will 
be a statement belonging to others: to Einstein, to physicists. Relative to me, this 
statement is “external and depends on signs that belong to others” (275a3-4). I have 
no authority over it.’ (2010, p. 40) 
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The text is without the presence of its author who is unable to defend himself 
against any possible misinterpretations or accusations made against him.  
Socrates’ use of figurative language to describe the relationship 
between writing and legitimacy operates within the framework of parental 
authority.  Much like the relationship of painting to the object in the sensual 
world with this in turn depending upon the real and Ideal world, a tripartite 
hierarchy is being proposed with the father as the source of linguistic and 
legitimate authority, with the spoken word as the ‘legitimate’ son and the 
written word as the ‘illegitimate’ son.14  
It is clear that the spoken word is the privileged medium with which 
knowledge is acquired and Phaedrus confirms this relationship: ‘You’re 
talking about the living, ensouled speech of a man of knowledge. We’d be 
right to describe the written word as a mere image of this.’ (276c) The 
spoken interaction between the lover and the beloved is framed as a process 
of question and answer that requires a slow pace where ideas are reflected 
upon, challenged and maybe re-considered. When the dialectical process is 
successful, ‘it is alive and it transfers its life to the interlocutor whose soul is 
transformed by the communication.’ (Rabbas 2010, p. 37)  
On this account, an interesting point is raised by Derrida who 
questions Socrates’ analogy of speaking as a writing on the soul (276a, 
278a): given his insistence on the negative features of writing as the medium 
to pursue knowledge and truth, why does he use such an analogy? Doesn’t 
this subvert all his own efforts at delineating a specific method for 
philosophical investigation? Is he being ironic?15 Should he not be taken 
seriously? Or, perhaps, is he trying to warn us about the relationship between 
writing and the philosophical way of life? There is clearly a distinction 
between those who Socrates considers ‘lovers of wisdom’ since they rely on 
the spoken word for the discovery and transmission of knowledge and those 
who rely on the written text and who have the titles of poets, speech-writers 
and law-writers bestowed upon them. (278d-e) 
                                                 
14 Again, a reviewer suggested that perhaps there is a correspondence between the 
tripartite division in the chariot myth and the tripartite division mentioned here. The 
parallels could be as follows: Just as the father has the legitimate authority to 
command, the same would apply to the charioteer; and just as there the father has 
two sons, one legitimate and the other illegitimate, likewise the chariot is moved by 
two desires, one diligent and seeking what is the ultimate good, the other unruly and 
seeking what is immediately good. This should only be considered a tentative 
characterisation; as with analogies it is at times difficult to see how far one can 
stretch an analogy. 
15 Lentz points out that this paradox has led some such as Burger to think that Plato 
‘really’ didn’t mean to attack writing and that this should be taken as an example of 
Socratic irony (1983, p.296). 
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Despite the bias towards the spoken word, the condemnation of 
writing is not wholesale. As Derrida points out ‘The conclusion of the 
Phaedrus is less a condemnation of writing in the name of present speech 
than a preference for one sort of writing over another…’ (1981, p.149) This 
can be seen in Socrates’ claim that written texts can be justified if they serve 
for ‘amusement’ or if they function as reminders for when human memory 
starts to fail as we get older. Phaedrus comments that this use of writing is 
still a better way of passing one’s time, rather than the ‘trivial pastimes’ that 
others pursue in their lives. However, Socrates is quick to remind him that 
amusement is one thing, but certain issues – such as those of justice – are too 
important to be dealt with adequately in written texts. Such issues should be 
the exclusive domain of the ‘expert dialectician’ who communicates his 
knowledge to others (276d-277a). 
Waterfield introduces an interesting way of moving beyond the 
paradox of writing in the Platonic corpus. He argues that while it is possible 
to say that Plato included his own writings in the critique of writing, it can 
also be argued that Plato, having pointed out its limitations, feels that he can 
go beyond this limitation. In other words, having alerted us to the issues of 
writing to his satisfaction it is now possible to continue with the 
philosophical way of life. This way of life is possible through the use of the 
dialogical form of writing which, as opposed to other forms of writing, is the 
closest one can get to real life philosophical conversation. This explains why 
the Platonic dialogues are modelled as a process of asking and answering 
questions. The philosopher-teacher wants to educate his student in the art of 
questioning in order to become a philosopher – as opposed to one who 
merely repeats - like written texts, what they have heard. The specific 
qualities of the Platonic dialogue show that it cannot be classified with other 
forms of writing such as speech-making, legal writing or poetry; it is literally 
a class of its own. 
This explanation provides, I think, an adequate response to the 
paradox of writing mentioned above. The Platonic text is not there to deliver 
a definitive content, to tell us what to think. Rather it is there to teach us how 
to think by introducing the reader to the practice of philosophical 
questioning.  Through reading Plato one learns how to do philosophy and if 
philosophy is to transform the person by inducing him to the search for truth, 
then the written texts – despite their limitations – can serve as inspirations on 
how to pursue such a way of life. 
If this argument is accepted, it might be further claimed that the text 
can also provoke its readers into critically engaging with it. In other words, 
despite the absence of the author (for example, despite the absence of Plato) 
the text of the Phaedrus can be read in a philosophically productive manner 
that simulates real world philosophical discussion. It is possible to enlist the 
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hermeneutics of H.G. Gadamer whose concept of the fusion of horizons 
would demonstrate the way a philosophical dialogue with a text can be re-
enacted (2003, pp. 306-7, 374-5). It is perhaps no coincidence that Gadamer 
utilises the logic of question and answer as a way of engaging philosophical 
texts. Returning to the question of writing in the Phaedrus, it can be claimed 
that while the primary mode of philosophizing is conducted through face to 
face interaction, the relationship between the text and its reader provides a 
secondary model that should not be discarded out of hand.  
There are several ways to read the Phaedrus or, for that matter, any 
text. In this paper, I have focused on what I have called ‘communicative 
practices’ to produce a reading that takes into account the possibilities 
inherent within the text; it is the text that makes possible its interpretation 
from the perspective of the forms and media of communication. By using 
this perspective, I hope to have shown that the Phaedrus teaches us the most 
appropriate form and medium of communication that enables a person to 
pursue the search for truth, or more appropriately, with falling in love with 
the philosophical way of life. 
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